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In most poor countries, small firms and self employment are the dominant forms of business 
enterprise. This phenomenon is true not only in agriculture and the service sector: even in 
manufacturing, large fractions of the workforce are self-employed.  In Ghana, as an illustration, 
more than 75 percent of the manufacturing workforce were self-employed in 1984. For rich 
countries, in contrast, self-employed people account for very small shares of manufacturing 
employment and almost negligible fractions of output.  Some observers explain the prevalence 
of self-employment in poor countries as a phenomenon of distorted policies or credit market 
imperfections. This paper, in contrast, uses a variant of the Lucas (1978) span-of-control model 
to ask whether changes in establishment size and employment structure can be explained as a 
consequence of growing productivity.  A model, calibrated to Japanese time series data, is 
shown to mimic key features of cross-country and time series data.  An implication is that 
changes in relative factor prices, driven by changing productivity, account for a large portion of 
the cross-country differences in establishment size and self-employment rates.  Although policy 
distortions and market imperfections may also be important in explaining the prevalence of self 
employment in developing countries, productivity changes alone could account for as much as 






   
 
Introduction 
  Small businesses dominate the economic life of most developing countries.  Despite the 
attention given to multinational corporations, it is family firms and the self employed who fill the 
market stalls of Accra and Agra, Dhaka and Dakar.  As was the case in the United States or 
Great Britain two hundred years ago, small businesses account for the majority of employment 
in all sectors of today’s developing countries.  Some of the most visible small businesses are 
those engaged in service activities: restaurants, automotive repair shops, and food stands.  
Agriculture is less visible, but as in rich countries, farming is almost exclusively the realm of 
family enterprises. 
Perhaps more surprising, however, is the importance of the self employed in the 
manufacturing sector in many developing countries.  From cramped workshops and backyard 
foundries emerges an astonishing array of manufactured goods: clothing, footwear, pottery, 
metal products, processed foods, cement blocks, to name a few.  In most developing countries, 
vast amounts of manufactures are produced on a scale unimaginably small by the present-day 
standards of the United States or Europe.  In Ghana, as an illustration, more than 75 percent of 
the manufacturing workforce reports being self-employed.  Fewer than 15 percent of 
manufacturing workers are employed in establishments with more than 10 workers (Republic of 
Ghana 1987, 1991).   
  In most rich countries, by contrast, small enterprises play a relatively minor role.  
Despite the boosterism of local Rotarians ￿ and despite the claims of researchers such as Birch 
(1987) ￿ the smallest businesses account for a tiny fraction of output in the United States and 
other rich countries.  For example, in the United States manufacturing sector, establishments 
with fewer than 5 employees accounted for less than 1 percent of the value added in 1987, 





   
Department of Commerce 1987).  Establishments with fewer than 20 employees accounted for 
less than 5 percent of the total manufacturing workforce, whereas firms with more than 500 
employees employed about two-thirds of manufacturing workers.  If all manufacturing workers 
in the United States are ranked by the number of co-workers that they have (i.e., by the size of 
the establishment in which they work), the median worker in this distribution has between 2,500 
and 5,000 co-workers (U.S. Department of Commerce 1987). 
  The data from the United States and Ghana are consistent with a broad range of cross-
section and time series evidence suggesting that as countries grow richer, small businesses and 
own-account work play a diminishing economic role (Gollin 1997).   What accounts for the 
differences in establishment characteristics between poor and rich countries?  Can a standard 
model adequately capture the relationship between economic development and the structure of 
production and employment?  Are faulty policies chiefly responsible for suppressing the 
emergence of large firms in poor countries? 
  This paper attempts to shed light on such questions by analyzing a model that 
incorporates establishment size explicitly.  The model, based on the Lucas span-of-control 
framework (1978), is explored quantitatively, using parameters drawn from Japanese time 
series data.  The calibrated model performs remarkably well in reproducing key features of the 
Japanese data – and also succeeds in replicating a variety of cross section and time series 
observations from other countries.   
  Analysis of the model suggests that the large differences observed across countries in 
establishment size and employment structure can be explained to a surprising extent by 
differences in productivity and factor prices.  Although distortionary policies – such as taxes that 
repress the growth of larger firms – undoubtedly play a role in exacerbating these effects, there 





   
the model suggests that it is efficient in poor countries for many lower-skilled people to remain 
self-employed. 
  The first section of this paper briefly summarizes key facts concerning establishment size 
and economic growth and poses some research questions that emerge from the data.  The 
second section outlines a span-of-control model that is used to address the research questions.  
The third section describes the procedure by which the parameters of the model were chosen 
and the ways in which the model was used to address research questions.  The fourth section 
reports data on the behavior of the model economy.  A fifth section explores the sensitivity of 
the model to alternative specifications and parameterizations. Finally, the sixth section offers 
some interpretation and draws conclusions from the behavior of the model economy. 
 
1.  Patterns and trends in establishment size and employment structure 
As early as the classical economists, observers have noted that economic growth is 
accompanied by a concentration of production in ever-larger units and by a corresponding 
decline in self employment and family enterprises.  In more recent times, empirical work by 
Kuznets (1966), among others, documented this tendency in cross-country data.  Kuznets 
suggested that one of the principal "characteristics of modern economic growth" was a series of 
shifts in the structure of production: from small to large firms; from self employment to wage 
work; and from unincorporated enterprises to large corporations.  A number of types of data 
reinforce this view today. 
 
1.1  Cross-section and time series data  
  Perhaps the most direct data on self employment come from labor force surveys.   
These typically categorize people in the work force according to the 1958 United Nations 





   
convention, the labor force consists of employers and own-account workers, employees, 
unpaid family workers, members of producer cooperatives, and persons not classifiable 
by status.
1  The International Labour Organization (ILO) collects national-level data on 
employment status from a large number of participating countries.  These data are highly 
comparable across countries: the categories are well-defined and easily understood. The data 
are usually collected as part of population censuses, and there are few incentives for people to 
lie about their employment status.  (In contrast, surveys of firms may systematically understate 
establishment size, since in many countries larger establishments face added taxes and 
regulations.)   The ILO reports national-level data on the employment status of manufacturing 
workers for more than 50 countries for the years 1988-93.
2  Table 1 shows the ratio of 
employers and own-account workers to all workers for the manufacturing sector and for the 
entire economy in all countries for which current data are available.
3  (For convenience, I will 
refer to this as the entrepreneur-workforce ratio, where the workforce is presumed to consist of 
entrepreneurs and workers.
4)  
  The manufacturing sector data indicate clearly that in poor countries, relatively large 
proportions of the workforce are employers or own-account workers.  Relatively few people in 
                                                 
1 The definitions of these categories are given as Appendix 1. 
2 The data are apparently based on figures obtained from national statistical authorities.  There seem to be 
some systematic gaps in the responding countries: in particular, there are relatively few poor countries 
reporting data (especially from Sub-Saharan Africa) and relatively many rich countries.  (The data are 
essentially complete for the OECD nations.)  Thus, the data cannot be considered to represent a random 
sample of all countries, but they do provide a large fraction of the potential sampling population. 
3 I use manufacturing data here for simplicity.  Data are available on other sectors as well; manufacturing 
sector data are used here to limit confusion that might arise from differences in the sectoral composition of 
output across countries.  For example, the agriculture share of total product is higher in poor countries than 
in rich countries.  Since agricultural production almost everywhere is dominated by self-employment and 
family business, and since agriculture tends to be a large sector in poor countries, we might expect that poor 
countries will appear at the aggregate level to have relatively high levels of self-employment and family 
business.  For this reason, it makes sense to focus only on the manufacturing sector. 
4 For rhetorical purposes, I will occasionally use the term "employers and own-account workers" in place of 






   
poor countries work for wages in the manufacturing sector.
5  The data make clear the 
relationship between the entrepreneur-workforce ratio and per capita GDP.  It is evident that in 
poor countries, far larger shares of the workforce are entrepreneurs than in rich countries.  
  The differences across countries are striking.  In the United States, less than 2 percent 
of the manufacturing workforce consisted of employers or own-account workers.  In 
Bangladesh and Nigeria, by contrast, almost 80 percent of manufacturing workers were 
employers or own-account workers.  Although some rich countries, such as Italy, are known 
for having vital small business sectors, these are relatively modest outliers: there is a surprisingly 
close relationship between per capita product and the entrepreneur-workforce ratio.  The 
cross-section data thus support the idea that fundamental differences exist at the establishment 
level between today's poor and rich countries. 
  A reasonable question is whether the time series data reveal similar differences in the 
entrepreneur-workforce ratio as economies grow.  Although it is difficult to obtain time series 
data that reflect the same range of income per capita as the cross section, the experiences of a 
few rapidly growing countries suggest that the time series data are broadly consistent with the 
cross section.  Table 2 shows time series data for Japan.  Time series data for Japan and other 
rapid-growth countries appear to be consistent with the cross-country observations. 
  This story is reinforced by the full ILO data, which include observations over time for 
308 observations on 84 countries dating to 1946.
6  Appendix 2 presents these data in full.  Both 
                                                 
 
5 Note that the approach used here implicitly treats unpaid family laborers and those not classifiable by 
status as employees, rather than employers.  This may actually understate the proportion of entrepreneurs 
in the workforce in developing countries. 
 
6 The observations included were most countries and years for which data were available at the level of the 
manufacturing sector and for which manufacturing sector employment exceeded 10,000 workers.  Excluded 
were countries of the former Soviet bloc, where the concept of entrepreneurship was unclear during much of 
the period in question.  Also excluded was a small number of island nations and other low-population 
countries.  In some cases, for larger countries, certain years were omitted because data were not available at 





   
across countries and within countries, the data reveal a pronounced negative relationship 
between real per capita GDP and the entrepreneur-workforce ratio.
7   
  In addition to data on employment, Gollin (1997) reviews a variety of additional data 
supporting the idea that self employment and small enterprise are more prevalent in poor 
countries than in rich and that establishment size tends on average to increase with per capita 
income.  One additional measure is the share of GDP that is earned by the proprietors of 
unincorporated enterprises ￿ which are generally small and often are operated as family 
businesses or as forms of self employment.  Table 3 presents cross-section data on the 
“operating surplus of unincorporated enterprises,” taken from United Nations data on national 
income and product accounts. It appears from Table 3 that income from unincorporated 
enterprises is generally less important in rich countries than in poor. 
  In conclusion, cross-country and time series data indicate that there are large differences 
across countries and over time in establishment size and rates of self employment.  These 
differences appear to be linked to levels of economic development.   
 
1.2  Theories of the firm and firm size 
  Standard models of neoclassical growth do not account for the changes we observe in 
firm size and self employment.  Most growth models assume constant returns to scale at the 
level of the firm and hence abstract from establishment-level behavior.  As a result, these models 
do not grapple with questions of establishment size.  Moreover, the standard models abstract 
from individuals' employment decisions and typically omit the self-employment sector.   Within 
the literature on industrial organization, however, there is a substantial body of theory on the 
                                                 
 
7 For this section, all data on real GDP per capita are taken from the Penn World Tables v. 5.6.  This data set 
provides estimates in terms of constant 1985 US dollars to 1950 for most countries.  For some countries, the 
data do not extend back to 1950.  In six instances, the ILO data include observations on the entrepreneur-
workforce ratio for years prior to 1950.  In these cases, linear extrapolation was used to estimate real per 





   
nature of the firm and on firm size.  One set of theories attributes the formation and size of firms 
to transaction costs, property rights, information constraints, and strategic behavior within firms. 
 (See, for example, Coase 1937, Stigler 1968, Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Williamson 1985 
and 1989, Holmström and Tirole 1987, and Hart and Moore 1990.) A different theoretical 
approach is posed by Kremer (1993), who suggests that the size distribution of production units 
is related to the complexity of production processes and the distribution of skills among 
workers. 
  An alternative approach abstracts from questions of intra-firm incentives and information 
and instead attempts to model an industry with a size distribution of firms. This is the strategy 
followed by Lucas (1978), who uses heterogeneity in a fixed factor of production to generate an 
equilibrium with firms of different sizes. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) analyze a model in which 
liquidity constraints determine the growth patterns of individual firms and generate a distribution 
over firm size.  Hopenhayn (1992) uses exogenous productivity shocks, which affect firm size, 
in a model of firm entry and exit that seeks to simulate the processes of job creation and 
destruction.  Jovanovic (1994) generalizes the Lucas model to an environment in which people 
are heterogeneous in labor quality as well as in managerial ability. 
  Within the development literature, there is a longstanding recognition that small firms 
play an important role in poor countries.  Hirschman (1958), Rostow (1960), Kuznets (1966), 
Lewis (1965), and many of their contemporaries recognized that structural changes in 
employment and firm size were a central feature of economic growth.  However, as Fafchamps 
(1994) points out, these authors implicitly viewed heterogeneity of firm size in developing 
countries as a disequilibrium phenomenon in which small firms were destined to vanish as 
economies adjusted to new technologies that required a larger scale of production. 
  Within the more recent literature on development, a number of authors have focused on 





   
Mead (1999) offer a valuable summary of the empirical literature on micro and small 
enterprises, based on detailed field surveys. Liedholm and Mead characterize patterns of firm 
birth, death, and growth and explore some of the interactions between small enterprises and the 
macro economy. In a similar vein, Biggs and Srivastava (1996) draw on a number of recent 
surveys to characterize manufacturing enterprises in Africa. 
   A frequent argument is that perverse government policies restrict the formation and 
growth of large firms, thereby forcing people into self employment or the “informal sector” (e.g., 
de Soto 1989).  Alternatively, imperfections in labor or capital markets are seen as restricting 
the growth of firms.  (See for example, Aryeetey and Steel 1992, Aryeetey et al. 1994, Biggs 
and Srivastava 1996, Liedholm 1993, Teal 1994, and Teal 1995, for a few examples.)  
 
2.    A model of establishment size and employment status in the context of 
economic growth 
This paper offers a Lucas-type model of establishment size and employment status and asks 
whether such a model is a useful for answering questions about economic growth and 
development.  Several questions motivate this research.  First, would our theories of growth be 
improved if we incorporated explicit treatment of establishment size and employment status?  
Second, to what extent can we account for differences across economies in establishment size 
and employment status as consequences of technological change (and corresponding 
adjustments in relative factor prices)?  Third, how important are policies in affecting the size 
distribution of firms?  Are small enterprises so widespread in poor countries primarily because 
policies discriminate against larger enterprises, as de Soto (1989) and others have argued? Are 






   
  To analyze questions about the evolution of establishment size and self-employment, this 
paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the fraction of self-employed workers 
is endogenously determined and can change with economic growth.  The model is based on 
Lucas (1978), but it extends the Lucas framework to an infinite time horizon and explicitly 
includes consumers and self-employed people.   
  For a given economy, there is a single sector producing a composite good which can be 
consumed or used as capital.  People in the model economy differ ex ante only in their 
entrepreneurial ability.  In each period, people can choose among three alternative forms of 
employment: wage work, self employment, and full-time entrepreneurship.  Workers receive the 
market wage, w, while full-time entrepreneurs receive the rents from operating a firm.  The self-
employed divide their time between physical production and other entrepreneurial activities 
needed for operation of an establishment.  The self-employed receive some entrepreneurial 
rents as well as a return to time spent in production.  Individuals make their employment 
decisions in such a way as to maximize earnings (since they are indifferent, in terms of utility, 
between the three uses of their time).   
  In equilibrium, people sort themselves by occupation according to their levels of 
entrepreneurial ability.  Those with levels of entrepreneurial ability below an endogenously 
determined level, z1, have a comparative advantage in wage work.  Those with levels of 
entrepreneurial ability above the endogenously determined level  z2 will choose to be full-time 
entrepreneurs, where z z 2 1 ‡ .  If  z2 is strictly greater than  z1, then there will be a group of 
people with intermediate levels of entrepreneurial ability who choose self-employment.  (If  
z z 2 1 =  then there will be no self-employment.)   
  The analysis presented in this paper considers the steady-state performance of a 
number of different model economies.  These economies are identical except for differences in 





   
achieve relatively high levels of steady-state output.  Countries with low levels of aggregate 
productivity are, in relative terms, poor.  By comparing rich model economies with poor ones, it 
is possible to understand the relationship between per capita output and the structures of 
production and employment. 
  The analytic framework employed here has a number of attractive features.  In addition 
to imitating some of the observed patterns in the size distribution of firms, it lends itself well to 
empirical work.  Macroeconomic data on the model economy can be compared to data from 
actual economies.  The next sections describe the model in more detail. 
 
2.1  Environment 
  Formally, the environment is characterized by the following features.  In a particular 
model economy, denoted i, there is a measure one of infinitely-lived people, who are indexed 
on the interval [0,1] by entrepreneurial ability, x.  There is a distribution D(x) over skill types.  
 
2.1.1  PREFERENCES AND ENDOWMENTS 
  People in the model economy have identical, preferences defined over their lifetime 




  In addition to skills, individuals are endowed with one unit of labor in each time period, 
which is supplied inelastically; and with  k0 units of initial capital, also supplied inelastically. 
 










   
2.1.2  TECHNOLOGY: 
  At each date, a single good is produced; this can be consumed or saved as capital to be 
used in the next time period.  The production process involves three factors: labor, capital, and 
entrepreneurial ability.  The latter is not traded, and it is distributed heterogeneously within the 
population.  
  Production can take place in two types of establishments: those operated by full-time 
entrepreneurs and those operated by the self-employed. In either type of establishment, an 
individual’s entrepreneurial ability, x, determines the amount of output attained from given levels 
of capital and labor.  Thus, the entrepreneur’s choices of n and k depend on her level of 
entrepreneurial ability, x.  Optimal establishment size is thus determinate, and it varies across 
individual entrepreneurs. 
  The two types of establishments face an identical production technology but differ in 
two respects.  First, the self-employed face a size restriction on their firms: they may use no 
more than a units of labor input, where 0 £ a £ 1.  This reflects the time constraint faced by the 
self-employed.  A second difference between the two types of establishments is that self-
employed entrepreneurs have an advantage in managerial efficiency, relative to full-time 
entrepreneurs.  This reflects the substantial incentive advantage that the self-employed face with 
respect to labor supervision.  Specifically, this advantage is represented by a scalar term 
SE A that enters multiplicatively into the managerial technology.
8  
  In equilibrium, entrepreneurs with relatively high ability will choose to face the lower 
managerial productivity associated with operating large establishments, but some people of 
more modest ability will be better off operating at a small scale using only their own labor.   
                                                 
8 This is consistent with a number of observations suggesting that the productivity of small and micro firms 





   
 
Full-Time Entrepreneurs 
  Specifically, an individual of type x who is a full-time manager of a firm with n workers 
and k units of capital in country i produces output: 
 
where f  is constant returns to scale, increasing, and concave in each argument, and where 
1 0 < <q .  Note that countries differ only in the value of the scalar Ai.  The parameter q reflects 
the fact that production displays decreasing returns to scale in capital and labor, due to the fixed 
factor (entrepreneurial ability).  
 
Self-Employed People 
  An individual of type x who is self-employed produces output according to the 
production function: 
where f and q are the same as above and ( ) 1 0 £ £ £ a x nt . As noted above, the parameter 
SE A  is an indicator of productivity in establishments operated by the self-employed, relative to 
productivity in establishments operated by full-time entrepreneurs.  Note that SE A is invariant 
across countries.
9  
                                                                                                                                                 
Tybout 1998), although one-person firms tend to have lower measured productivity than firms with 2-10 
workers.  
9 Although it appears that  SE A and a are not separately identified, the two parameters have slightly 
different effects in the model.  This issue is discussed in greater detail below. 
  ( ) [ ]
q k n, f xA   = y  i ,  (2) 
  ( ) [ ]





   
 
2.2  Individual's problem 
  An individual in this economy must choose the type of employment that will maximize his 
or her income.  The returns from working for a wage are simply w, which the individual takes as 
given.  Note that all individuals are homogeneous as wage workers; differences in 
entrepreneurial ability do not alter labor productivity.
10  The individual compares this wage with 
the income derived from self-employment and from full-time management, and chooses the 
occupation that gives the highest income.   
 
2.2.1  INCOME FROM SELF-EMPLOYMENT  
  The returns from self-employment consist of entrepreneurial rents as well as the market 
value of the time available for labor.
11  Thus, a self-employed individual earns  ( ) p t
SE x , where 
this income includes returns to labor as well as rents:   
  ( ) { } ( ) [ ] ( ) t t t t t t i SE k n
SE
t n w k r k n f A A x x - + - = a p










  Note that the derived demand for n and k depend on the individual's level of 
entrepreneurial ability, x.  In equilibrium, individuals with sufficiently low levels of x will prefer 
wage work to self employment, and individuals with sufficiently high levels of x will prefer full-
time management.   
                                                 
10 See Jovanovic (1994) for a model in which individuals differ in labor productivity as well as entrepreneurial 
ability. 
11 Implicitly, I assume that the self employed are able to divide their labor time between their own 
businesses and the wage market; in other words, the fraction (1 - a) of their time is devoted to managing a 
business and perhaps to some transaction costs associated with dividing their labor among uses.  The 
fraction a is then used for productive labor. The alternative assumption, that they cannot use their labor in 
the wage market, would obviously make self employment far less attractive but would not qualitatively 





   
 
2.2.2  INCOME FROM FULL-TIME MANAGEMENT 
  An individual who operates a firm as a full-time manager will receive only the 
entrepreneurial rents.  These individuals receive no returns to labor time.  Rents increase with 
the individual's level of entrepreneurial ability, x, so that those with low values of x will not in 
general choose to be full-time managers.  
  Given x, the would-be manager chooses levels of labor and capital inputs to maximize 
rents.  This is a straightforward problem.  Thus, the full-time manager's income is given by: 
  ( ) { } ( ) [ ] t t t t t t i k n
FT
t k r n w k n f A x x - - =
q p , max ,    (5) 
 
0 , . . ‡ t t k n t s  
 
2.2.3  CONSUMER'S PROBLEM 
  Having chosen an employment option to maximize income, the individual faces a 
straightforward problem in allocating this income to current-period consumption and to savings. 
  
  Denote the individual's maximum income from employment in a given period as: 
 




t t t p p p , , max =    (6) 
 
  The individual's decision rules can be represented by marker functions.  Let  ( ) m x t =1if 
the individual earns maximum income from full-time management, and let  ( ) m x t = 0otherwise.  
Similarly, let  ( ) s x t =1 if the individual earns maximum income from self-employment, and let 





   
  The problem of a consumer with entrepreneurial ability x can be written as: 
where 
s
t k  denotes the capital supplied by the consumer, in contrast with 
d
t k , which denotes 
capital demanded by a particular entrepreneur. 
 
2.3  Equilibrium 
  An equilibrium for this economy consists of sequences: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } [ ] 1 , 0 , , , , , , , , 0 ˛ "
¥




t t t  
such that: 
(i)  The consumer's problem is solved for all individuals x ˛ [0,1]. 
  (ii)  All establishments are maximizing profits, taking prices as given. 
(iii)  The usual feasibility and market clearing conditions are satisfied, for all t.   
     
  The market-clearing condition for the goods market is given in Equation (8), which 
holds that consumption plus investment must not exceed the sum of production from the self-
employed and from establishments operated by full-time entrepreneurs.  On the right-hand side 
of Equation (8), the first term gives the output of all firms operated by full-time entrepreneurs, 
while the second term gives the output of the self-employed. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) x d x k x d x k x n f A A x x s
x d x k x n f A x x m x d x k x d x c
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   (8) 
   
  Market-clearing in the wage labor market is given in Equation (9).  This condition 
requires that the demand for wage workers by full-time entrepreneurs must not exceed the 
supply of wage labor.  In particular, the left-hand side of Equation (9) is the total amount of 
labor used by establishments operated by full-time entrepreneurs.  The first term on the right-
hand side is the measure of people who choose neither self-employment nor full-time 
entrepreneurship, and the second term gives the supply of wage labor from the self-employed. 
   
 













   
  Finally, the market for capital services clears when: 
   
  The structure of the model immediately implies that people's work choices,  ( ) m x t  and 
( ) s x t , will be (weakly) monotonic in x.  In other words, at each date, there will be two cutoff 
levels of entrepreneurial ability  z t 1 and  [ ] z t 2 01 ˛ , such that everyone with a skill level below  z t 1  
will work, and everyone with a skill level above z t 2  will be a full-time manager, while individuals 
with intermediate levels of entrepreneurial ability (i.e.,  [ ] x z z t t ˛ 1 2 , ) will be self-employed.  
This can be expressed more formally as: 
PROPOSITION 1: 
  At each date t, if there are both self-employed people and full-time 





m x x z
m x x z





























The proof of this proposition follows directly from the fact that  ( ) p t x is 
increasing in x.   
 
  It is worthwhile to note, however, that for some parameter values, there may be no self-
employed people in the economy.  Alternatively, for some parameterizations, there may be no 
full-time entrepreneurs.  
 














   
 
2.4  Computing the equilibrium 
  The competitive equilibrium for this problem is somewhat complex, since at any date t, 
individuals x earn different incomes and face different budget constraints.  The solution is 
simplified, however, since all consumers have identical, homothetic preferences, and since they 
differ only in income.  By standard aggregation theorems, this implies that the competitive 
equilibrium has the same prices and aggregate consumption as an alternative model with a 
representative consumer.  This allows us to abstract from the consumption decisions of 
individuals in the economy, although on the production side, it is important that individuals of 
different entrepreneurial ability choose employment and allocate their labor optimally. 
  A convenient way to compute the equilibrium with a representative consumer is to begin 
with the period-by-period problem of solving for the aggregate output obtained from any level 
of aggregate capital stock.  This is a straightforward competitive problem: capital and labor must 
be allocated across firms in such a way as to equalize marginal products.  Each entrepreneur 
chooses which technology to operate — the self-employment technology or the full-time 
technology.  Capital and labor inputs are chosen to minimize costs.  
  As a practical matter, it is computationally intensive but not conceptually difficult to 
solve this single-period problem.  Given a wage, w, and a rental rate for capital services, r, it is 
simple to find the marginal self-employed person, z1, and the marginal full-time manager, z2, 
assuming that both exist.  Thus, it remains only to search for the wage and rental rate at which 
markets clear.  This is straightforward.  The solution to the single-period problem can be 
obtained for any start-of-period capital stock.  This effectively defines a map from aggregate 
capital stock into aggregate production, which can be denoted as  ( ) K Fi .  Given this 
production function, the representative consumer's problem takes on a standard form; it can be 
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1 0 . .




   (11) 
 
2.5  Solving for the steady state  
  Hornstein and Prescott (1993) have shown that span-of-control models of this type 
exhibit nice properties in spite of heterogeneity among producers.  In particular, the feasible 
production set for this economy can be represented as a McKenzie-type convex cone.  
Together with the standard preferences used in the model, this is sufficient to ensure that a span-
of-control model will behave in the aggregate much like any other growth model with an 
aggregate constant returns to scale production technology.  In particular, the model economies 
will display stable steady states.   
  For each model economy (where model economies differ by the level of capital and 
labor productivity,  Ai), the steady state is characterized by a value K
* of aggregate capital 
stock (the only state variable in the aggregate production map) such that consumers choose to 
save K
* units of capital for the next period; i.e., K
* is the fixed point in the representative 
consumer's policy function.  In the steady state, aggregate capital and output remain constant, 
along with consumption, labor supply, and all other variables of interest.  In particular, the cutoff 
point between workers and managers remains fixed, as does the cutoff point between self-
employed and full-time managers. 
  Computationally, it is straightforward to identify the steady state.  We can evaluate the 
value function numerically and search for a fixed point in the related policy function.  Through 
successive refinements of the state space, it is possible to compute the steady state to any 






   
3.  Quantitative Experiment 
  Using this model as an analytic framework, it is possible to ask the kinds of questions 
outlined above.  In particular, I investigate the empirical properties of the model when it is 
calibrated to reproduce specified features of the data.   
  I begin by calibrating the model to data from the Japanese time series.  During the 20
th 
century, Japan’s economy has grown at a remarkable rate, and its structural transformation has 
included striking changes in firm size and the structure of employment.  In 1930, for example, 
almost one-third of Japanese workers were self-employed or full-time entrepreneurs, including 
29.1 percent of manufacturing workers.  By 1992, only 8.6 percent of manufacturing workers 
were self-employed.  Thus, Japan’s experience over time mirrors the phenomenon observed in 
comparisons of rich and poor countries today. 
  To calibrate the model, I use data on per capita income, capital stock, and factor shares 
at two moments in time (1930 and 1992) to determine parameter values for the production 
function used in the model.  In addition, I choose two key parameter values to match data on 
the prevalence of self employment at those dates.  Output from the calibrated model is then 
compared with data on the Japanese economy.   
  After exploring the time series data for a single country, I then ask how well the 
calibrated model succeeds in replicating key features of international cross-section data and time 
series data from other countries.  This part of the quantitative experiment can be seen as a test 
of the model’s robustness.   
  Finally, I explore the sensitivity of the model to changes in certain parameters.  
 
3.1  Assigning functional forms 
  To compute solutions for the model, functional forms must be specified and parameter 





   
technology, it uses  ( ) ( ) [ ]
r r r g g
1
1 , k n k n f - + = , which is a standard CES form.  As noted 
above, then, a full-time manager in country i with ability x gets output  ( ) [ ]
r
q
r r g g k n x Ai - + 1 , 
where 0 < q < 1.   
  I also need to select a functional form for the distribution of entrepreneurial ability, D(x). 
 In this model, entrepreneurial ability enters the production technology in a linear fashion, and it 
is indexed to the [0,1] interval.  I choose D(x) to be a beta distribution. This is a logical choice 
because the beta distribution has the useful property that its support can be limited to the [0,1] 
interval (in contrast to the normal or lognormal distributions, for example).  For added simplicity, 
I constrain my parameterization to be a symmetric bell curve with mean 0.5 and variance 0.25.  
This is satisfied by any beta distribution b (a, b) such that a = b.  The choice of a and b does 
affect the higher moments of the distribution.  I arbitrarily set a = b = 18, giving a distribution 




3.2  Empirical counterparts to model variables  
  The model economy has the following empirical counterparts.  Output and capital stock 
in the model are measured in thousands of constant U.S. 1985 dollars.  Output is real per capita 
GDP. The capital stock in the model is gross non-residential fixed capital stock per person 
employed.  I exclude residential capital because there is no home sector in the model.   I take 
real per capita GDP for Japan in 1930 from Maddison (1991), along with an estimate of the 
capital stock in 1930.  Real per capita GDP in Japan in 1992 is taken from the Penn World 
Tables v. 5.6.  
                                                 
12 In some sense, the choice of distribution is equivalent to choosing the units of measurement for ability 
and the representation of ability in the production technology.  Thus, conceptually and theoretically, it is 





   
  In the model economy, people may choose to work for a wage, to be self-employed, or 
to be full-time entrepreneurs.  The fraction of people who are self-employed plus the fraction 
who are full-time entrepreneurs corresponds to the share of “entrepreneurs and own account 
workers” in the manufacturing workforce, as reported in the 1940 and 1992 editions of the ILO 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics.  I use data for the manufacturing sector to abstract from 
changes in the sectoral composition of output. 
  Wages paid to workers in the model economy correspond to employee compensation 
in the national income and product accounts.  Returns to capital in the model economy, plus the 
labor income of the self-employed, plus entrepreneurial rents correspond to the national income 
accounting category of operating surplus.  Values for national accounts aggregates are taken 
from the United Nations National Income Statistics 1938-1948 and the OECD National 
Accounts: Main aggregates, 1960-1992. 
 
3.3  Calibration procedures 
  Given a value for q, the exponent on the managerial technology, the observations 
described above identify the values of all other model parameters. The calibration follows the 
following procedure: First, the values for d and b are obtained from the steady state conditions 
of the model and the observed factor shares and capital stock.  Second, the parameters of the 
production function, g and r, are obtained from the profit-maximization conditions of the model 
and from aggregate observations on factor shares and values of the aggregate capital-labor 
ratio, K/N.  Third, the values of a and ASE are chosen to match aggregate observations on the 
fraction of entrepreneurs in the workforce in economies with two different levels of aggregate 
productivity. 
  The parameter q gives the returns to scale associated with the CES production function. 





   
entrepreneurs.  It is essentially impossible to find macro data that distinguish effectively between 
entrepreneurial rents and returns to capital, for any economy.  There is substantial evidence, 
however, that capital and labor shares are relatively constant both across countries and over 
time, with labor shares around 0.65 to 0.70 and capital shares around 0.20 to 0.25 in many 
observations.
13  These figures suggest that entrepreneurial returns could be in the neighborhood 
of 0.10 of output, which corresponds to a value of q  = 0.90.  This is the value I use for the 
calibration.  I explore below the sensitivity of the model to modest changes in the value of q, as 
well as to changes in other parameter values. 
 
3.4  Assigning parameter values 
  Given a value for q, data on the Japanese economy and the steady-state conditions of 
the model determine the values of b and d.  In this model economy, it must be the case that in a 
steady state, capital accumulation should exactly offset depreciation, so that the capital stock 
remains unchanged.  Thus,  x K = d , where x is investment.  Japan’s average gross investment 
share of GDP for 1982-88 was 0.283, and its net investment share was 0.146.  De-trending the 
data to account for real growth and population growth, this implies a steady-state ratio of K/Y of 
2.879.
 14  Together with the depreciation share of GDP of 0.1373, this implies a depreciation 
rate of 0.0477. 
                                                 
13 Gollin (1997) shows evidence that labor shares ￿ as distinct from employee compensation shares ￿ are 
relatively constant across countries, with most countries in the range 0.6 to 0.8.  This finding contrasts with 
the widely held perception that labor shares are lower in poor countries than in rich, a perception based on 
confusion of labor shares with wage shares.  Because of the importance of self employment in poor 
countries, wage shares are typically quite low.  But when the data are adjusted to reflect the labor income of 
the self employed, poor and rich countries are essentially indistinguishable in terms of labor shares. 
14 The estimate of K/Y obtained in this fashion is very close to Maddison’s estimates of 2.77 for 1987 and 





   
  Given this value for d, it is straightforward to compute b by noting that the standard 
steady-state condition must hold, namely that  ( ) d
b
- + = 1
1
r .  To find the appropriate value of 
r, I need to calculate the steady state share of capital income in GDP.  This is not given directly 
in national income and products accounts.  In the model, however, there are three factors of 
production: labor, capital, and entrepreneurial ability.  I begin by computing total product as 
GDP less net indirect taxes.
 15  The assumed value of q directly implies that entrepreneurial rents 
are 0.10 of total product.  The labor share consists of employee compensation plus some 
fraction of the residual, which represents the labor income of entrepreneurs (as distinct from 
their rents).  I assume that ten percent of this residual is labor income.  This gives a labor share, 
Y
wN
, of 0.6315 and a capital share, 
Y
rK
, of 0.2685.  Combined with the estimated capital 
stock above, this implies a value for r of 0.0933 and hence a value for b of 0.9564. 
  Two additional parameters of interest relate to the production function.  The parameter 
g is the coefficient on the labor input in the production function, and r is related to the elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labor.  The calibration is sensitive to the value of r.  Lucas 
(1978) showed that in a model with only two occupational choices (workers and full-time 
entrepreneurs), capital accumulation would result in a declining fraction of entrepreneurs if and 
only if the elasticity of substitution was less than unity.  In the current model, the dynamics are 
more ambiguous, but it remains important to the results that the elasticity of substitution be less 
than unity.   
  For this paper, I rely on the structure of the model and solve for g and r from aggregate 





   
any two observations on the aggregate capital-labor ratio, K/N, and the labor and capital shares 
of income.  In particular, it follows from the firm’s problems that for all establishments in an 
economy: 
Since this equation holds for each firm, it also holds for aggregates.  Any two aggregate 
observations allow us to solve two equations in two unknowns.  
  For Japan, I use the average capital share of 0.2685 and the labor share of 0.6315, as 
described above.  Following an identical procedure, it is possible to compute the ratio of 
wN
rK
for Japan in 1938.
16  The labor share of total product (GDP less indirect business taxes) 
was 0.399 and the capital share was 0.501, giving a value for 
wN
rK
of 1.257.  
  Using Maddison’s estimate (1991) that K/N for Japan was $3,704 in 1930 and  
normalizing the units of output and capital to thousands of 1985 U.S. dollars, Equation (12) then 
implies that r = -0.4393 and g  = 0.3095.
 17  This value for r implies an elasticity of substitution 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Note that this approach to computing net output is equivalent to assuming that net indirect taxes are 
borne by labor and capital in proportions equivalent to their share of total output.  Although this may not be 
strictly accurate, there is no obvious alternative.  
16 I assume that the same figures apply to 1930, but I can find no national income accounts for years closer 
to 1930. 
17 The data given by Maddison (1991) may seem high to those accustomed to the figures given in some 
other data sources, such as Summers and Heston’s Penn World Tables v. 5.6. The difference between the 
two sources is that Summers and Heston employ a straight-line depreciation technique to value capital 
assets over the expected lifetime of each class of assets, whereas Maddison assigns each asset class its full 
value for the duration of its working lifetime.  These differing approaches to valuation yield different 
assessments of the value of the capital stock, with differences of about a factor of two across the two data 
sets. The two approaches also yield slightly different estimates for Japan’s rate of capital accumulation.  
Maddison’s estimates give a growth rate of capital per worker for 1950-87 of 6.92 percent.  The PWT 
estimates imply a growth rate for 1965-92 of 7.92 percent.  My calibration of r depends on the relative levels 
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between capital and labor of s = 0.695, well within the range considered plausible by many 
economists. 
  There are two additional parameters in the model: the size constraint on the businesses 
of the self employed, a, and the managerial efficiency advantage of the self employed, ASE.   
Given the parameter values above, I calibrate a and ASE to match the observed rates of 
entrepreneurship in Japanese manufacturing in 1930 and 1992.  The relevant facts are that in 
1930, per capita GDP in Japan was $1,539 and the fraction of employers and own-account 
workers in the manufacturing workforce was 0.292.  In 1992, per capita GDP was $15,105 
and the fraction was 0.086.  Specifically, I guess values for the aggregate productivity 
parameter, Ai, to give steady-state output levels of 1.539 and 15.105. I then calibrate a and ASE 
so that both economies have a fraction of employers and own-account workers that matches 
the data.  I update my guesses of Ai, and I iterate on this process until it “converges” in the 
sense that the two steady states match the data on entrepreneur-workforce ratios. 
  As a practical matter, a and ASE have different effects in the model.  Since a essentially 
places a limit on the time worked by a self-employed person, it can be interpreted as reflecting 
the opportunity cost of self employment in terms of lost labor income.  This becomes a relatively 
more important effect as wage rates rise in the economy.  Thus, lowering the value of a, holding 
everything else constant, is likely to decrease the attractiveness of self employment in all 
economies – but relatively more so in economies with high wage rates (i.e., high values of Ai).  
By contrast, ASE shifts the advantage of self employment equally across all economies. The two 
instruments are thus sufficient to match the data. 
  My calibration yields a value for a of 0.425 and a value for ASE of 1.31.  These values 
suggest that self employed people use between a third and a half of their work time to perform 
physical production activities (e.g., sewing, hammering, etc.) but are about one-third more 
                                                                                                                                                 





   
productive than firms of comparable size operated by full-time managers. Although there is no 
obvious test of these parameters, they both appear to fall within plausible ranges.
18 
  Table 4 summarizes the parameter values used in the quantitative experiments described 
below.  
 
3.5  Description of the experiment 
  The procedure followed was to consider a number of separate economies for which all 
parameters were identical except for the aggregate productivity level Ai.  For a given economy, 
Ai was fixed and a steady state was found computationally.  Corresponding to the steady state 
are levels of capital and product per capita, Ki
* and Yi
*, along with all other equilibrium 
elements. From this exercise, it is possible to create a map from steady-state values of output 
per capita, Yi
*, to steady-state measures of entrepreneurs, factor shares, and other variables of 
interest. 
  The model does not attempt to describe the process of technical change; instead, the 
paper takes cross-country productivity differences as given. In other words, an economy is 
defined by an aggregate productivity level, Ai, that remains fixed through time.  Implicitly, this 
implies that productivity changes are neutral between capital and labor.  The virtue of this 
approach is that it makes it possible to model differences in productivity across economies 
without imposing restrictive assumptions about the form or process of growth.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
the PWT figures for Japan’s capital stock go back only to 1965. 
18 A number of empirical studies purport to show that small firms are less “efficient” than larger firms (e.g., 
Uribe-Echevarria 1992, cited in Fisher et al. 1997).  It is unclear, however, whether such studies are in fact 
documenting inefficiency or whether they are instead reflecting differences if factor intensity, unobserved 
heterogeneity, joint production, or other phenomena.  Other studies, such as a careful analysis of Indian 
manufacturing enterprises by I.M.D. Little et al. (1987) report no systematic differences in total factor 
productivity across firms of different size.  Strikingly, a long-standing literature in agricultural economics 
supports the notion that small farms are more productive than large farms, with incentive issues playing an 
important explanatory role. (See, for example, Hayami and Ruttan 1985). Tybout (1998) notes, however, that 





   
disadvantage of this approach is that it does not do a good job of representing the behavior of 
people in economies that are experiencing rapid technological change.
19  
 
4.  Results of Quantitative Experiment 
  By construction, the calibrated model exactly replicates the entrepreneur-workforce 
ratios for the Japanese manufacturing sector in 1930 and 1992.  Perhaps more surprising, the 
model economy also reproduces other features of the Japanese time series data, such as factor 
shares.  For example, the employee compensation shares of GDP in the model economy track 
relatively closely to those observed in the data.  In 1930, the employee compensation share for 
the model economy was 0.4080, while the data give a figure of 0.3435.  For 1992, the model 
economy gives 0.6287, while the data show 0.6040.   
  Perhaps a better test of the model, however, is how useful it is in explaining data other 
than those to which it was calibrated.  The following paragraphs report several different tests.  
First, entrepreneur-workforce ratios from the model economy are compared to time series data 
for three groups of countries: rapidly growing economies in East and Southeast Asia, OECD 
countries, and the world’s poor countries.  Second, entrepreneur-workforce ratios from the 
model are compared to cross-section data for all countries with available data.  Third, the 
entrepreneur-workforce ratios from the model are compared to pooled cross-section and time 
series data from all available observations.  Next, similar comparisons are made using factor 
shares from the model economy and from a number of actual economies.  In all these cases, the 
model economy offers a good representation of the data.  Finally, the model outputs are 
compared to the predictions of standard growth models. 
 
                                                 
19 This problem is in some sense unavoidable: theory does not offer a good alternative.  To assume 





   
4.1  Entrepreneur-workforce ratios 
  Several types of data allow us to evaluate the usefulness of the model as a description of 
self employment and entrepreneurship across countries.  
 
4.1.1  TIME SERIES DATA 
  The model presented in this paper is designed to illuminate the relationship between 
growth and the structure of employment, it is particularly useful to see how well the model 
succeeds in characterizing the changes observed in a number of rapidly growing economies. 
Figure 2 shows time series data for the ratio of employers and own-account workers to the total 
manufacturing workforce in a number of East and Southeast Asian economies that experienced 
rapid growth in the period since the Second World War.  These data are compared to output 
from the model. 
  The results are striking.  The model economy appears to display roughly the same 
pattern as the data for Thailand and Malaysia, and it parallels the data for Korea.  Across this 
set of countries and over time, there appears to be a relatively uniform trend in the entrepreneur-
workforce ratio, and the model economy displays a similar trend.  The model’s predictions are 
too high, almost uniformly, but the shape of the graph corresponds well to the data.
20 
                                                                                                                                                 
certainty that they will (relatively soon) be living in an economy that exactly corresponds to today's United 
States. 
20 In the discussion that follows, two goodness-of-fit measures will be reported for the model. First, it is 
possible to compute an R-squared value for the model output, based on the calculation R
2 = 1 – (sum of 
squared errors)/(total sum of squares). Note that for an arbitrary model, as opposed to a least-squares-
minimizing approach, it is no longer the case that the R-squared is bounded below by 0. In this particular 
case, the predicted values from the model yield an R-squared of 0.246, compared to an R-squared of 0.655 for 
an OLS regression of the entrepreneur-workforce ratio on a constant, real per capita GDP, its inverse, its 
square, and its cube. Thus, the model captures more than a third of the variation that could be picked up by 
a fitted polynomial regression line.  
 
An alternative measure of goodness of fit is given by regressing the actual values on model predicted 
values and a constant. In general, a model fits the data well if the coefficient on the constant is close to zero, 





   
  Does the model perform equally well in matching entrepreneur-workforce ratios from 
rich countries?  Figure 3 presents the model output in relation to time series data for OECD 
countries.  The model appears to overpredict the share of entrepreneurs in the workforce for 
these countries - in some cases dramatically.  But a number of countries display data that 
parallel the model output reasonably closely, including Denmark and Italy.  In general, the model 
predicts that the fraction of entrepreneurs should remain fairly flat for countries with per capita 
income in excess of $5,000.  This corresponds to time series observations for most rich 
countries.
21 
  A similar exercise can be undertaken for the poorest countries in the data.  Figure 4 
compares the model output to time series data for a group of 10 of the poorest countries in the 
data.  Again, the data display a strong negative relationship between levels of GDP per capita 
and the fraction of the workforce consisting of employers and own account workers.  In this set 
of countries, the relationship appears to be fairly strong, though somewhat erratic: the time series 
data do not show monotonic trends in either GDP per capita nor in the entrepreneur-workforce 
ratio.  Nonetheless, the model appears to reproduce the essential pattern - namely, a rapid 
drop in the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy as economies grow.
22 
                                                                                                                                                 
a regression of actual values on a constant term and model predictions yields an adjusted R-squared of 
0.593. The estimated coefficient on model predictions is 0.983 with a standard error of 0.179, and the 
estimated coefficient on the constant is –0.057 with a standard error of 0.050. These results suggest that the 
model predictions track the data reasonably well but with a substantial amount of noise. The negative 
coefficient on the constant term confirms the visual observation that the model overpredicts the data. 
21 The predicted values of the model yield an R-squared of –2.28, compared with an R-squared of 0.529 for 
an OLS regression of the entrepreneur-workforce ratio on a constant, real per capita GDP, its inverse, its 
square, and its cube. As noted above, it is possible for the model to have a negative R-squared value. A 
negative value implies that the model does less well as a predictor than would the mean value of the 
entrepreneur-workforce ratio. In this case, the model systematically overshoots the data. Regressing the 
actual values on model predictions and a constant term yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.461, with a 
coefficient on model predictions of 0.618 (standard error 0.086) and a coefficient on the constant of -0.017 
(standard error of 0.011). The implication is that the model tracks the pattern of the data reasonably well but 
strongly overpredicts the actual data. 
22 The predicted values of the model yield an R-squared of –0.126, compared with an R-squared of 0.435 for 





   
  Looking across these separate sets of countries, then, the model appears to capture 
some of the central features of the time series data on entrepreneur-workforce ratios.  It is 
worthwhile to ask also whether it performs equally well in matching the cross-section data and 
the pooled time series and cross-section data. 
 
4.1.2  CROSS-SECTION AND PANEL DATA 
  Instead of comparing the model output to time series data, we can ask how well it 
matches observations across countries at a particular moment in time.  Does the model 
accurately convey the relationship between GDP per capita and employment structure that we 
find in the cross-section data?  Figure 5 compares the model output to data on the fraction of 
employers and own account workers in the manufacturing workforce across countries.  The 
observations included are the most recent ones available for all 50 countries with available data 
from the years 1988-92.  The model does extremely well in replicating the key features of these 
cross-section data.
23  
  Similarly, the model does an excellent job of accounting for the pattern displayed in the 
panel created by pooling all available time series and cross section data, as shown in Figure 6.  
Although the model slightly underpredicts the fraction of entrepreneurs in the workforce in poor 
                                                                                                                                                 
square, and its cube. In this case, the model substantially underestimates two extreme values from Pakistan. 
As a result, the sum of squared errors is 12 percent higher than would be obtained from predicting the mean. 
Regressing the actual values on model predictions and a constant term yields an adjusted R-squared of 
0.192, with a coefficient on model predictions of 0.936 (standard error 0.296) and a coefficient on the 
constant of 0.090 (standard error of 0.090). The implication is that the model does a reasonably good job of 
accounting for fairly noisy data, though it overpredicts the data slightly. 
23 The predicted values of the model yield an R-squared of 0.673, compared with an R-squared of 0.768 for 
an OLS regression of the entrepreneur-workforce ratio on a constant, real per capita GDP, its inverse, its 
square, and its cube. This implies that the model captures almost 90 percent of the variation that can be 
captured by the best-fit line passing through the data. Regressing the actual values on model predictions 
and a constant term yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.700, with a coefficient on model predictions of 1.233 
(standard error 0.117) and a coefficient on the constant of –0.043 (standard error of 0.023). The implication is 






   
countries and overpredicts the fraction in rich countries, the model succeeds in capturing the 
general shape and pattern of the data.
24   
 
4.2  Factor shares 
  Another dimension in which the model appears to perform well is in matching cross-
section and time series data on factor shares.   
 
4.2.1  EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION SHARES 
  In the United States and most other rich countries, the wage share of output is often 
found to be between 0.65 and 0.75, with the capital share generally computed as the residual.  
The wage share has shown remarkably little variation over time.   
  Across countries, however, employee compensation as a share of output is substantially 
lower in poor countries.  This is occasionally interpreted as implying that labor shares are lower 
in poor countries than in rich countries, but in fact employee compensation is only a partial 
measure of labor income.  Part of the income of the self-employed also should be viewed as 
labor income and included in calculations of the labor share. Gollin (1998) argues that the 
apparent disparities in labor shares are related to differences across countries in the importance 
of self employment and the corresponding differences in the share of national income accruing to 
business proprietors.  The model presented here helps to account for the observed patterns of 
factor shares. 
                                                 
24 The predicted values of the model yield an R-squared of 0.581, compared with an R-squared of 0.628 for 
an OLS regression of the entrepreneur-workforce ratio on a constant, real per capita GDP, its inverse, its 
square, and its cube. This implies that the model captures about 93 percent of the variation that can be 
captured by the best-fit line passing through the data. Regressing the actual values on model predictions 
and a constant term yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.620, with a coefficient on model predictions of 1.315 
(standard error 0.059) and a coefficient on the constant of -0.080 (standard error of 0.014). The implication is 
that the model does a very good job of accounting for the data, though it significantly underpredicts low 





   
  Figure 7 shows employee compensation shares of national income across countries and 
compares data with the output of the model.  The model does a reasonably good job of 
matching the data.  Most of the observations from actual economies are relatively close to the 
path predicted for the model economies.
25 The model slightly overpredicts the employee 
compensation share, particularly for rich countries, but it shows that changes in productivity 
alone can generate substantial changes in the share of employee compensation in output.
  As with the entrepreneur-workforce data, it is striking that the model predicts relatively 
flat employee compensation shares for rich countries.  This is consistent with the time series data 
for current rich countries, which show little trend over time in the employee compensation share. 
 At the same time, the model predicts a rapid increase in the employee compensation share for 
poor countries.  Thus, the model’s predictions are consistent with both cross-section and time 
series data on factor shares. 
  It is important to note that the behavior of the employee compensation share is not 
directly determined by the fraction of employees in the economy, since it also depends on wage 
rates.  Thus, the employee compensation share is independent of the data reported above on 
the fraction of entrepreneurs in the workforce.  The model offers a useful framework for 
understanding observations on factor shares across countries and over time. 
 
4.2.2  OPERATING SURPLUS OF PRIVATE UNINCORPORATED ENTERPRISES 
  Another share that can be observed in the model economy is the fraction of output 
accruing to the owners of sole proprietorships as operating surplus.  Operating surplus is 
                                                 
25 The predicted values of the model yield an R-squared of 0.140, compared with an R-squared of 0.467 for 
an OLS regression of the entrepreneur-workforce ratio on a constant, real per capita GDP, its inverse, its 
square, and its cube. This implies that the model captures about 30 percent of the variation that can be 
captured by the best-fit line passing through the data. Regressing the actual values on model predictions 
and a constant term yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.443, with a coefficient on model predictions of 0.751 
(standard error 0.093) and a coefficient on the constant of 0.052 (standard error of 0.047). The implication is 





   
defined as value added less net indirect taxes, less employee compensation, less gross fixed 
capital formation.  For actual economies, the operating surplus of private unincorporated 
enterprises (OSPUE) is often reported in the national income and product accounts.  For the 
model economy, there is no category of business establishments that directly corresponds to 
“private unincorporated.”  As a proxy, however, it is reasonable to assume that the 
establishments operated by self-employed people are primarily private and unincorporated.
26  
  Figure 8 shows the operating surplus of self-employed people in the model economy, as 
a share of total product.  The line representing the model economy is contrasted with data on 
OSPUE for a sample of actual economies. The model economy generally understates the 
observed levels of OSPUE/GDP, as we would expect.  Interestingly, however, the model 
matches the general trend and curvature of the data, and the magnitudes in the model economy 
are somewhat close to those in the data.
27 
 
4.3  Growth facts 
  The model economy is broadly consistent with the Kaldor-Solow stylized growth facts. 
 In particular, it displays essentially constant real prices of capital services,
28 capital-output ratios 
that decline slightly with income per capita (arguably consistent with the data) and fairly stable 
capital and labor shares for countries across a wide range of GDP per capita.  
                                                 
26We might reasonably expect that some other businesses would be private and unincorporated as well, but 
there is no obvious way to make this distinction in the model. 
27 The predicted values of the model yield an R-squared of 0.144, compared with an R-squared of 0.617 for 
an OLS regression of the OSPUE share on a constant, real per capita GDP, its inverse, its square, and its 
cube. This implies that the model captures about 23 percent of the variation that can be captured by the 
best-fit line passing through the data. Regressing the actual values on model predictions and a constant 
term yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.562, with a coefficient on model predictions of 1.281 (standard error 
0.232) and a coefficient on the constant of -0.189 (standard error of 0.079). The implication is that the model 
does a decent job of accounting for the data, though it significantly overpredicts OSPUE at high levels of 
GDP. 





   
  The output from the model economies makes clear how improvements in factor 
productivity bring about changes in firm size and the structure of employment.  Figure 6, which 
shows the entrepreneur-workforce ratios in model and actual economies, can be interpreted as 
showing how growth creates incentives for large fractions of the population to exit from self-
employment and to move into wage labor.  Productivity growth increases the marginal product 
of labor (and hence the wage rate), making wage work more remunerative than self-
employment.  In the model economies considered here, these effects are large.   
 
5.  Sensitivity  
  The following paragraphs report the sensitivity of the model’s output to changes in key 
parameters. It also shows that a “stripped-down” version of the model yields similar qualitative 
results. 
 
5.1  Changes in parameter values 
  The key parameters in the model are those characterizing the production technology 
(specifically, r and g) – and, in particular, the two parameters relating to the relative 
performance of the self-employed (a and ASE). The model clearly responds to changes in the 
values of these parameters, but possibly in non-linear ways. The approach followed in this 
paper is to consider the effects on the model’s output from increasing or decreasing these four 
parameters by an arbitrarily chosen 20 percent.  
  Qualitatively speaking, none of the changes alters the basic result of the model – namely, 
that the fraction of entrepreneurs in the workforce falls as productivity rises. The key to this 
result is that r must remain negative, as shown in Lucas (1978).
29 Thus, the qualitative 
                                                 
29 Intuitively, this condition requires that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor lies on the 
Leontief side of the Cobb-Douglas case. This means that increases in productivity induce increases in 





   
implications of the model are robust to minor changes in parameter values. Nonetheless, it is 
worth considering the effects of minor perturbations. 
  Figure 9 shows the sensitivity of the model to changes in g. Recall that g is the coefficient 
on labor in the CES production technology. Not surprisingly, an increase in g reduces the 
fraction of entrepreneurs in the workforce, since it reduces the return to labor. Conversely, a 
decrease in g tends, ceteris paribus, to increase the fraction of entrepreneurs. Figure 9 shows 
the baseline value of g = 0.3095 against a low value of approximately 0.25 and a high value of 
0.37. 
  Figure 10 shows the model output under the baseline value of r = –0.4393, compared 
with a “low” value of –0.3514 and a “high” value of –0.5272. Again, in a qualitative sense, the 
model’s output is not greatly affected by the change. An increase in the absolute value of r shifts 
the curve downward. This corresponds to a decrease in the substitutability between capital and 
labor, and intuitively such a change implies that as productivity rises and steady-state capital 
stocks rise, there will be a higher return to labor than in a world where the two inputs are more 
closely substitutable. Consequently, more workers are pulled out of the ranks of the 
entrepreneurs. Conversely, a decrease in the absolute value of r has the effect of shifting the 
curve upward for high values of A. 
  Figures 11 and 12 show the sensitivity of the model to changes in ASE and a. Both of 
these parameters have large effects in shifting the output of the model. Recall that these 
parameters have been chosen jointly to match the two observations from the Japanese data, 
rather than having been derived from the data or the model. Thus, we are less interested in 
sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameters than with understanding how they affect the 
model’s output. The point to be noted from Figures 11 and 12 is that the shape of the curve 
                                                                                                                                                 
entrepreneurship into labor. Consider the extreme case in which machines and workers are perfect 
complements; then an increase in the number of machines demands a one-for-one increase in the number of 





   
remains relatively similar even when the levels of ASE and a are changed. This suggests that the 
general tendency of the model to replicate the overall pattern of the data is quite robust. 
 
5.2  Sensitivity to model specification 
This section reports the results of an experiment in which a “stripped-down” version of 
the model is simulated quantitatively. This experiment is designed to achieve two purposes. 
First, it shows that the essential qualitative result of the model is fairly robust to specification and 
parameterization: the proportion of entrepreneurs in the economy will fall as productivity rises, 
so long as the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less than unity. Second, this 
experiment underscores the point that a serious model of the structural transformation of 
production must incorporate more features than the “stripped-down” model. Without an explicit 
self-employment sector, and without making some assumptions about certain parameters, the 
model will not provide a useful framework for considering real-world policy questions. 
The model considered here is the same in most respects as the one described above in 
Section 3. The main difference is that self-employment is no longer included as an explicit 
alternative. All firms face the same technology; i.e.,  
For this experiment, the distribution D(x) is taken to be uniform on [0,1]. The production 
technology has three parameters: q, r, and g. I take q  = 0.9, r  = -0.5, and g  = 0.5. 
Preferences are the same as in Section 3, and the discount and depreciation rates are kept the 
same as in Section 4. The main difference between this experiment and the previous ones, then, 
is that the self-employment sector is no longer modeled explicitly, and the distribution of 
entrepreneurial ability is no longer bell-shaped.  
  ( ) [ ]





   
  Figure 13 shows the results of this experiment for three different values of the 
productivity parameters, A. For each value of A, the time path of the entrepreneur-workforce 
ratio is shown plotted against the date. It is clear that even for the stripped-down model, the 
accumulation of capital along the time path leads to a corresponding reduction in the fraction of 
entrepreneurs in the workforce, consistent with the theoretical prediction. The magnitude of the 
change is relatively small, however. Even for the lowest level of productivity, with initial capital 
less than 10 percent of its steady-state value, the reduction in the fraction of entrepreneurs is 
modest. And the steady-state differences in the fraction of entrepreneurs, across different values 
of A, are not large.  
  Another way to view the results of this experiment is by plotting the fraction of 
entrepreneurs against output along the time path. (See Figure 14.) The time path is characterized 
by increases in output, gradually arriving at a steady-state value; the fraction of entrepreneurs 
falls as predicted, characterized by a fairly steep pattern along the time path. These graphs show 
what would happen to the fraction of entrepreneurs in a stripped-down economy as capital 
accumulation drives up the productivity of labor.  
  The output of the stripped-down model makes clear that the essential qualitative 
relationship between productivity and entrepreneurship holds for a broad class of models, as 
demonstrated by Lucas (1978). Although the model from Section 3 is sensitive to changes in 
parameters, functional forms, and other specifications, the qualitative result is robust.  
 
5.3  Tax policy effects 
Productivity differences can thus affect the structure of production and the fraction of 
entrepreneurs in the workforce. As noted above, however, a considerable literature suggests 
that policies may also have important effects on the size distribution of firms. For example, larger 





   
of taxation, which may make it unprofitable for authorities to enforce tax laws against self-
employed). This model offers a useful framework for considering the effects of such policies.  
  In the simplest scenario, consider a policy regime that can be summarized by two effective 
tax rates – one for the self-employed, and one for firms operated by full-time managers. 
Consider these to be technological taxes, such that the output of a full-time manager of ability x 
can be written as: 
and the output of a self-employed person can be written as: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ]
q t k n f A A x y i SE SE , 1- = .  (15) 
  Assume for simplicity that all tax revenues are used to produce a good that enters the 
utility function of consumers in an additively separable way.  
  Note that the tax rate is not identifiable from productivity rates in (14) and (15). Even if 
we normalize tSE to zero, we cannot identify tFT from ASE. Qualitatively speaking, however, it is 
clear that as tFT rises, fewer individuals will choose to be full-time managers. This also reduces 
the demand for wage labor. As a result, the ranks of the self-employed will increase from two 
sources: former full-time entrepreneurs and former workers. 
  Figure 15 shows the relationship between tax rates and the fraction of entrepreneurs in the 
workforce, for different values of Ai. In this figure, each value of Ai corresponds to a specific 
vertical line in the figure. Points along each line represent different values of the tax rate tFT , 
with the highest point reflecting a value of tFT  = 0.35 and the lowest point given by the baseline 
case, with tFT  = 0.0. It is clear that differential tax rates on firms of different sizes have the 
potential dramatically to alter the fraction of entrepreneurs in the workforce – with implications 
for both the size distribution of firms and the level of self employment. With Ai = 1.5, the 
fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy rises from 0.21 at a tax rate of zero to 0.86 when the 
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tax rate on large firms rises to 0.35. At a higher level of productivity (Ai = 5.5), the fraction of 
entrepreneurs rises from an undistorted figure of 0.097 to the much higher value 0.76.  
  It is also possible to measure the consequences of such distortionary taxes for steady-
state aggregate output. For countries with high productivity (Ai = 5.5), moving the tax rate from 
0.0 to 0.35 leads to only a 10 percent reduction in steady-state output. For countries with lower 
productivity, however, the repercussions are more severe. At Ai = 1.5, increasing the tax on 
large firms from 0.0 to 0.35 leads to almost a 40 percent reduction in steady-state output. This 
reflects the fact that distortionary taxes, in the model, simply shift the locus of production from 
large firms to small ones. In a world with pure constant returns to scale, of course, there would 
be no loss associated with this shift. In the model, however, production losses stem primarily 
from the reduction in skill levels of the average manager. 
    
 
6.  Conclusions and Implications 
  Previous theories of development have largely abstracted from questions of 
establishment size, despite substantial evidence that average establishment size — and 
particularly the level of self-employment — changes dramatically as economies grow.  This 
paper asks to what extent we can account for the observed changes in establishment size in a 
standard theoretical framework.  It then asks to what extent we can improve our understanding 
of various phenomena by explicitly modeling changes in establishment size. 
  The conclusion of this research is that a model with explicit treatment of establishment size 
and self-employment can reconcile a number of disparate features of the data.  Not only can 
such a model mimic the data on entrepreneur-workforce ratios across a wide range of 
countries, but the model also performs well in explaining cross-country observations of factor 





   
  The model fits the data quite well, both in predicting the fraction of employers and own-
account workers and in predicting factor shares.  It is not, of course, a perfect fit. Some 
deviations from the model’s predictions may arise from policies that affect the incentives for self 
employment. As Section 5.3 illustrates, such policies can generate substantial variation in the 
entrepreneur-workforce ratio among countries at similar income levels.  Given that the model 
without policies accounts for about two-thirds of the variation in the cross-section data (as 
measured by the R-squared of 0.673), there is substantial scope for policy and market 
imperfections to play a role in explaining the size distribution of firms. For example, Table 1 
shows that Bolivia, with a real per capita GDP of $1,721, had an entrepreneur-workforce ratio 
of more than 50 percent in the manufacturing sector, while the Philippines, with essentially the 
same level of real per capita GDP, had an entrepreneur-workforce ratio of only 29 percent. 
Policies and regulation may play an important part in accounting for such differences. 
  Nonetheless, the model reminds us that we need not invoke policy distortions to account 
for the broad prevalence of self employment in poor countries. Even in the absence of 
distortions, countries like Bolivia and the Philippines should be expected to have higher levels of 
entrepreneurship – and more small firms – than would be found in rich countries.
30 
  This insight has important implications for development policies aimed at small 
enterprises and the informal sector.  Policies aimed at favoring large firms over small ones in 
poor countries, in the interests of promoting “efficiency” or “modernization,” are likely to be 
misguided. Indeed, any efforts to alter the prevailing size distribution of firms should be 
appraised critically. There may be value in programs that redress missing markets or remove 
distortions, such as micro-credit schemes or liberalization of laws that inhibit the formation and 
expansion of firms.  But in the poorest countries, it is unreasonable to imagine that such policies 
                                                 
30In a separate paper (Gollin 1995), I investigate the effect of distortionary policies that impose different tax 





   
will make the “informal sector” disappear or lead to huge reductions in self-employment rates. 
Moreover, distortions aimed at altering the size distribution of firms may be costly, in terms of 
aggregate output, for poor countries. 
                                                                                                                                                 
distribution of firms, and I find that they are costly in the aggregate.  The model predicts, however, that even 





   
 
Table 1: Proportion of workforce consisting of entrepreneurs, own-account 
workers, and unpaid family laborers: manufacturing sector and entire 
economy.  Countries are ordered by real GDP per capita. 
 















Central Af.  Rep.  514   0.571   0.834   Uruguay           5185   0.229   0.248  
Nigeria           978   0.780   0.753   Malaysia          5746   0.156   0.381  
Honduras          1385   0.407   0.471   Mexico            6253   0.245   0.435  
Pakistan          1432   0.389   0.614   Greece            6783   0.305   0.444  
Bangladesh        1510   0.792   0.745   Venezuela         7082   0.204   0.301  
Philippines       1689   0.279   0.508   Korea, Rep.       7251   0.156   0.383  
Bolivia           1721   0.502   0.413   Portugal   7478   0.119   0.246  
Egypt             1869   0.277   0.474   Ireland    9637   0.056   0.196  
El Salvador       1876   0.399   0.346   Spain        9802   0.125   0.214  
Peru              2092   0.249   0.393   Israel       9843   0.111   0.166  
Morocco           2173     0.254   New Zealand  11363   0.104   0.191  
Paraguay          2178   0.287   0.305   Finland           12000   0.055   0.135  
Botswana          2198   0.286   0.236   Singapore   12653   0.051   0.132  
Sri Lanka         2215     0.352   Italy         12721   0.141   0.252  
Guatemala         2247   0.464   0.504   U. K.     12724   0.133   0.106  
Ecuador           2830   0.514   0.501   Austria      12955   0.052   0.135  
South Africa      3068     0.070   Netherlands  13281   0.027   0.103  
Tunisia           3075   0.302   0.289   Belgium      13484   0.059   0.162  
Panama            3332   0.232   0.328   France      13918   0.049   0.136  
Colombia          3380   0.244   0.293   Sweden      13986   0.053   0.091  
Costa Rica        3569   0.207   0.271   Denmark    14091   0.050   0.102  
Iran              3685   0.397   0.407   Australia   14458   0.062   0.149  
Turkey            3807   0.311   0.573   Germany, W.     14709   0.044   0.099  
Poland            3826   0.069   0.259   Japan             15105   0.119   0.197  
Brazil            3882   0.127   0.330   Norway            15518   0.029   0.095  
Thailand          3942   0.300   0.695   Canada            16362   0.016   0.094  
Syria             3994   0.384   0.440   Hong Kong         16471   0.105   0.118  
Hungary           4645   0.100   0.133   U.S.A.           17972  0.019   0.082  
Chile             4890   0.228   0.296          
               
 
Source:  Data on real GDP per capita are taken from the Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6.  Figures are 
given in constant dollar terms, using 1985 as a base year, and following a Chain Index.  Data on labor 






   
 
Table 2: Employers and own account workers as share of 
manufacturing workforce in Japan. 
 
Year  Real per 
capita GDP 
Entrepreneurs 
as share of 
manufacturing 
workforce 
1930  1539  0.292 
1947  1400  0.163 
1950  1430  0.135 
1955  2053  0.104 
1960  2954  0.089 
1965  4491  0.085 
1970  7307  0.105 
1975  8381  0.099 
1980  10072  0.106 
1985  11771  0.086 
1992  15105  0.086 
 
Source: ILO Yearbooks of Labour Statistics, various years; PWT v. 






   
 
Table 3: Operating surplus of unincorporated enterprises 
(all sectors), selected countries.   
 
Country  Operating surplus of 
private unincorporated 
enterprises, as share of  
GDP 
Real per capita 
GDP, in $1985 
at international 
prices 
Burundi  0.593  559  
India  0.347  1,204  
Côte d'Ivoire  0.307  1,419  
Jamaica  0.101  2,443  
Peru  0.453  2,724  
Ecuador  0.610  2,830  
Thailand  0.365  2,972  
Colombia  0.306  3,231  
Hungary  0.117  5,562  
Korea, Rep. of  0.249  5,607  
Portugal  0.251  6,010  
Spain  0.243  8,759  
New Zealand  0.181  11,501  
Italy  0.282  11,918  
Belgium  0.176  12,319  
United Kingdom  0.103  12,969  
Japan  0.112  13,156  
France  0.146  13,259  
Finland  0.110  13,377  
Sweden  0.087  14,408  
Norway  0.085  14,674  
Australia  0.134  14,704  
Canada  0.065  17,258  
United States  0.104  17,710  
Source:  United Nations, National Accounts Statistics: Main 
Aggregates and Detailed Tables: 1988 (New York: UN 
Publishing Division, 1990), and PWT v. 5.6. 





   
 
Table 4: Parameter values for quantitative 
experiment.  
Parameter  Value  Description 
b    0.9564  Discount factor 
d    0.0477  Depreciation rate 
q    0.90  Exponent on g ￿ 
entrepreneur’s share = 0.10 
g    0.3095  Labor coefficient in f 
r  -0.4393  Exponent on f ￿ s = 0.7016 
D(x)  b (18, 18)  Distribution of entrepreneurial 
ability 
a    0.425  Upper bound on labor input of 
the self-employed 
ASE    1.31  Managerial productivity 
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  APPENDIX 1 
 
  The United Nations classification system divides the civilian labor force into five mutually 
exclusive categories:  employers and own-account workers; employees; unpaid family workers; members of 
producer cooperatives; and others not classifiable by status.  These categories are defined as follows:  
 
  •  Employers and own-account workers 
Persons who operate their own economic enterprises or engage independently in a 
profession or trade.  Employers are those who hire one or more worker; own-account 
workers hire no employees. 
 
  •  Employees 
Persons who work for a public or private employer and receive remuneration in wages, 
salaries, tips, piece-rates or pay in kind. 
 
  •  Unpaid family workers 
Persons who work without pay in an economic enterprise operated by a related person 
living in the same household.  Where it is customary for young persons, in particular, to 
work without pay in an economic enterprise operated by a related person who does not 
live in the same household, the requirement of "living in the same household" may be 
eliminated. 
 
  •  Members of producer cooperatives 
Persons who are active members of producer cooperatives, regardless of the industry in 
which it is established.  (This group is in practice dropped in many countries where it is 
not numerically important.) 
 
•  Persons not classifiable by status 
Experienced workers whose status is unknown or inadequately described and 




  Source:  International Labour Office, Year book of labour statistics (Geneva:  International 
Labour Organisation, 1993) 
                                                 
 
31An alternative approach to classifying workers is given by the ICSE-93 Group approach, which provides 
guidelines for aggregating from standard employment classifications into the categories of employees; 
employers; own-account workers; members of producers' cooperatives; contributing family workers; and 
workers not classifiable by status.  The formal guidelines for classifying workers into these groups differ 





   
 
 
Appendix 2:  Share of entrepreneurs in manufacturing workforce, all 
available years, for countries with more than 10,000 manufacturing workers 
(excluding former socialist economies).  Countries ordered alphabetically by 
continent according to UN conventions. 
  Year  Real per 
capita GDP 
Share of entrepreneurs 
in manufacturing 
workforce 
       
Algeria  1966   1548   0.242  
Algeria  1977   2518   0.125  
Angola  1960   931   0.135  
Botswana  1991   2300   0.286  
Burundi  1979   487   0.384  
Cameroon  1976   888   0.553  
Cent. Af. Rep.  1988   588   0.555  
Egypt  1960   809   0.169  
Egypt  1966   1015   0.190  
Egypt  1976   1371   0.150  
Egypt  1989   1906   0.178  
Gambia  1983   721   0.914  
Ghana  1960   894   0.755  
Ghana  1984   785   0.767  
Lesotho  1976   837   0.370  
Liberia  1962   734   0.581  
Liberia  1974   1053   0.684  
Liberia  1984   869   0.557  
Mali  1976   495   0.293  
Mauritius  1962   3016   0.173  
Mauritius  1972   2566   0.142  
Morocco  1960   815   0.421  
Morocco  1971   1367   0.336  
Mozambique  1970   1497   0.125  
Nigeria  1986   973   0.775  
Reunion  1961   1134   0.199  
Reunion  1967   1600   0.146  
Reunion  1982   3074   0.101  
Rwanda  1978   693   0.455  
Sierra Leone  1963   1040   0.688  
Sudan  1973   705   0.494  
Tanzania  1967   397   0.363  
Togo  1981   683   0.654  





   
 
Appendix 2:  Share of entrepreneurs in manufacturing workforce, all 
available years, for countries with more than 10,000 manufacturing workers 
(excluding former socialist economies).  Countries ordered alphabetically by 
continent according to UN conventions. 
  Year  Real per 
capita GDP 
Share of entrepreneurs 
in manufacturing 
workforce 
       
Tunisia  1975   2050   0.360  
Tunisia  1984   2727   0.361  
Tunisia  1989   2771   0.243  
Zambia  1980   971   0.226  
Argentina  1960   4462   0.223  
Argentina  1970   5637   0.157  
Argentina  1980   6506   0.179  
Bolivia  1950   1274   0.412  
Bolivia  1976   1950   0.534  
Bolivia  1991   1696   0.406  
Brazil  1960   1784   0.112  
Brazil  1970   2434   0.107  
Brazil  1980   4303   0.084  
Brazil  1989   4271   0.107  
Chile  1952   2582   0.298  
Chile  1960   2885   0.230  
Chile  1970   3605   0.190  
Chile  1982   3460   0.149  
Chile  1992   4890   0.214  
Colombia  1951   1480   0.370  
Colombia  1964   1861   0.304  
Colombia  1992   3380   0.231  
Ecuador  1950   1194   0.318  
Ecuador  1962   1454   0.517  
Ecuador  1974   2498   0.433  
Ecuador  1982   3193   0.364  
Ecuador  1990   2755   0.493  
Paraguay  1972   1471   0.459  
Paraguay  1982   2414   0.410  
Paraguay  1991   2146   0.287  
Peru  1961   2134   0.439  
Peru  1972   2784   0.349  
Peru  1981   3062   0.311  
Peru  1991   2170   0.226  





   
 
Appendix 2:  Share of entrepreneurs in manufacturing workforce, all 
available years, for countries with more than 10,000 manufacturing workers 
(excluding former socialist economies).  Countries ordered alphabetically by 
continent according to UN conventions. 
  Year  Real per 
capita GDP 
Share of entrepreneurs 
in manufacturing 
workforce 
       
Uruguay  1975   4310   0.223  
Uruguay  1985   3969   0.182  
Uruguay  1991   4766   0.215  
Venezuela  1961   6387   0.314  
Venezuela  1971   7589   0.226  
Venezuela  1981   7209   0.107  
Venezuela  1991   6621   0.197  
Canada  1951   6511   0.055  
Canada  1961   7261   0.030  
Canada  1971   10599   0.014  
Canada  1981   14555   0.014  
Canada  1986   16029   0.015  
Canada  1992   16362   0.016  
Costa Rica  1963   2270   0.231  
Costa Rica  1973   3232   0.134  
Costa Rica  1984   3213   0.165  
Costa Rica  1992   3569   0.199  
Dominican Republic  1960   1195   0.328  
Dominican Republic  1970   1536   0.211  
Dominican Republic  1981   2285   0.168  
El Salvador  1961   1407   0.295  
El Salvador  1971   1815   0.304  
El Salvador  1991   1853   0.324  
Guatemala  1964   1771   0.433  
Guatemala  1973   2193   0.418  
Guatemala  1981   2534   0.368  
Guatemala  1989   2137   0.357  
Haiti  1950   950   0.520  
Haiti  1971   894   0.671  
Haiti  1982   933   0.444  
Honduras  1950   981   0.367  
Honduras  1961   1031   0.384  
Honduras  1974   1266   0.381  
Honduras  1992   1385   0.342  





   
 
Appendix 2:  Share of entrepreneurs in manufacturing workforce, all 
available years, for countries with more than 10,000 manufacturing workers 
(excluding former socialist economies).  Countries ordered alphabetically by 
continent according to UN conventions. 
  Year  Real per 
capita GDP 
Share of entrepreneurs 
in manufacturing 
workforce 
       
Mexico  1960   2836   0.180  
Mexico  1970   3987   0.199  
Mexico  1980   6054   0.161  
Mexico  1991   6018   0.175  
Nicaragua  1963   1928   0.372  
Nicaragua  1971   2344   0.337  
Panama  1950   1309   0.371  
Panama  1960   1575   0.244  
Panama  1970   2584   0.235  
Panama  1980   3392   0.117  
Panama  1991   3103   0.221  
United States  1950   8772   0.027  
United States  1960   9895   0.020  
United States  1970   12963   0.013  
United States  1980   15295   0.013  
United States  1992   17945   0.019  
Bangladesh  1961   972   0.503  
Bangladesh  1974   968   0.401  
Bangladesh  1981   1084   0.223  
Bangladesh  1989   1375   0.187  
Hong Kong  1961   2353   0.127  
Hong Kong  1966   3715   0.083  
Hong Kong  1971   4844   0.055  
Hong Kong  1976   6312   0.043  
Hong Kong  1981   9341   0.042  
Hong Kong  1986   11520   0.041  
Hong Kong  1991   15601   0.096  
India  1951   608   0.621  
India  1961   751   0.624  
India  1971   808   0.319  
India  1981   908   0.252  
Indonesia  1971   737   0.302  
Indonesia  1980   1281   0.405  
Iran  1956   2220   0.316  





   
 
Appendix 2:  Share of entrepreneurs in manufacturing workforce, all 
available years, for countries with more than 10,000 manufacturing workers 
(excluding former socialist economies).  Countries ordered alphabetically by 
continent according to UN conventions. 
  Year  Real per 
capita GDP 
Share of entrepreneurs 
in manufacturing 
workforce 
       
Iran  1976   6496   0.213  
Iran  1986   3590   0.346  
Iran  1986   3590   0.145  
Iraq  1977   6518   0.238  
Israel  1961   3781   0.172  
Israel  1972   7126   0.111  
Israel  1983   8259   0.085  
Israel  1991   9524   0.108  
Japan  1947   1400   0.163  
Japan  1950   1430   0.135  
Japan  1955   2053   0.104  
Japan  1960   2954   0.089  
Japan  1965   4491   0.085  
Japan  1970   7307   0.105  
Japan  1975   8381   0.099  
Japan  1980   10072   0.106  
Japan  1985   11771   0.086  
Japan  1992   15105   0.086  
Jordan  1961   1309   0.370  
Jordan  1979   3219   0.236  
Korea  1960   904   0.285  
Korea  1966   1163   0.211  
Korea  1970   1680   0.164  
Korea  1975   2323   0.118  
Korea  1980   3093   0.125  
Korea  1992   7300   0.119  
Malaysia (Peninsular)  1957   1291   0.311  
Malaysia (Peninsular)  1980   3799   0.153  
Malaysia  1988   5746   0.126  
Nepal  1961   611   0.546  
Nepal  1971   686   0.404  
Pakistan  1951   614   0.773  
Pakistan  1961   659   0.607  
Pakistan  1972   898   0.421  





   
 
Appendix 2:  Share of entrepreneurs in manufacturing workforce, all 
available years, for countries with more than 10,000 manufacturing workers 
(excluding former socialist economies).  Countries ordered alphabetically by 
continent according to UN conventions. 
  Year  Real per 
capita GDP 
Share of entrepreneurs 
in manufacturing 
workforce 
       
Pakistan  1992   1432   0.276  
Philippines  1960   1133   0.451  
Philippines  1970   1403   0.369  
Philippines  1975   1625   0.294  
Philippines  1992   1689   0.227  
Singapore  1957   1400   0.189  
Singapore  1970   3017   0.109  
Singapore  1980   7053   0.063  
Singapore  1992   12653   0.049  
Sri Lanka  1946   1000   0.480  
Sri Lanka  1963   1211   0.265  
Sri Lanka  1971   1251   0.185  
Sri Lanka  1981   1632   0.166  
Syria  1960   1575   0.219  
Syria  1970   2294   0.240  
Syria  1981   4664   0.237  
Syria  1991   3994   0.294  
Thailand  1960   943   0.328  
Thailand  1970   1526   0.247  
Thailand  1980   2178   0.227  
Thailand  1990   3580   0.200  
Austria  1951   3125   0.124  
Austria  1961   5388   0.085  
Austria  1971   7851   0.059  
Austria  1981   10407   0.048  
Austria  1991   12850   0.040  
Belgium  1947   4300   0.129  
Belgium  1961   5752   0.081  
Belgium  1970   8331   0.048  
Belgium  1981   10829   0.045  
Belgium  1990   13232   0.049  
Denmark  1950   5263   0.127  
Denmark  1955   5434   0.109  
Denmark  1960   6760   0.088  





   
 
Appendix 2:  Share of entrepreneurs in manufacturing workforce, all 
available years, for countries with more than 10,000 manufacturing workers 
(excluding former socialist economies).  Countries ordered alphabetically by 
continent according to UN conventions. 
  Year  Real per 
capita GDP 
Share of entrepreneurs 
in manufacturing 
workforce 
       
Denmark  1970   9670   0.064  
Denmark  1981   11153   0.043  
Denmark  1985   12969   0.035  
Denmark  1991   14015   0.042  
Finland  1960   5291   0.071  
Finland  1970   8108   0.027  
Finland  1976   9431   0.017  
Finland  1980   10851   0.021  
Finland  1985   12051   0.030  
Finland  1992   12000   0.055  
France  1954   4565   0.114  
France  1962   6401   0.079  
France  1968   8228   0.071  
France  1975   10297   0.041  
France  1982   11970   0.049  
France  1991   13870   0.049  
Germany  1961   6817   0.061  
Germany  1970   9425   0.042  
Germany  1992   14709   0.041  
Greece  1951   1474   0.273  
Greece  1961   2318   0.325  
Greece  1971   4506   0.289  
Greece  1981   5903   0.256  
Greece  1990   6768   0.256  
Iceland  1950   3808   0.102  
Iceland  1960   4964   0.076  
Ireland  1951   2730   0.114  
Ireland  1961   3479   0.059  
Ireland  1966   4005   0.042  
Ireland  1971   5130   0.039  
Ireland  1981   6985   0.033  
Ireland  1991   9395   0.055  
Italy  1951   2941   0.159  
Italy  1961   4919   0.129  





   
 
Appendix 2:  Share of entrepreneurs in manufacturing workforce, all 
available years, for countries with more than 10,000 manufacturing workers 
(excluding former socialist economies).  Countries ordered alphabetically by 
continent according to UN conventions. 
  Year  Real per 
capita GDP 
Share of entrepreneurs 
in manufacturing 
workforce 
       
Italy  1981   10285   0.114  
Italy  1991   12602   0.122  
Luxembourg  1947   5900   0.132  
Luxembourg  1960   7921   0.086  
Luxembourg  1966   8447   0.064  
Luxembourg  1970   9782   0.039  
Luxembourg  1981   11842   0.026  
Malta  1957   1271   0.154  
Malta  1967   1751   0.126  
Netherlands  1947   4300   0.102  
Netherlands  1960   6077   0.068  
Netherlands  1971   9466   0.031  
Netherlands  1981   11079   0.028  
Netherlands  1991   13196   0.023  
Norway  1946   4250   0.134  
Norway  1960   5610   0.072  
Norway  1970   8034   0.045  
Norway  1980   12141   0.026  
Norway  1992   15518   0.026  
Portugal  1950   1208   0.159  
Portugal  1960   1869   0.134  
Portugal  1970   3306   0.091  
Portugal  1981   5017   0.083  
Portugal  1992   7500   0.114  
Spain  1950   1913   0.129  
Spain  1970   5861   0.071  
Spain  1992   9802   0.106  
Sweden  1950   5807   0.117  
Sweden  1960   7592   0.052  
Sweden  1965   9402   0.043  
Sweden  1970   10766   0.026  
Sweden  1975   11958   0.021  
Sweden  1985   13451   0.014  
Sweden  1992   13986   0.052  





   
 
Appendix 2:  Share of entrepreneurs in manufacturing workforce, all 
available years, for countries with more than 10,000 manufacturing workers 
(excluding former socialist economies).  Countries ordered alphabetically by 
continent according to UN conventions. 
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Share of entrepreneurs 
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Switzerland  1980   14301   0.051  
Turkey  1970   2202   0.290  
Turkey  1975   2838   0.216  
Turkey  1980   2874   0.191  
Turkey  1985   3077   0.170  
Turkey  1992   3807   0.232  
United Kingdom  1966   7789   0.012  
United Kingdom  1971   8655   0.015  
United Kingdom  1981   10017   0.024  
United Kingdom  1992   12724   0.133  
Australia  1954   7049   0.066  
Australia  1961   7576   0.052  
Australia  1966   9145   0.044  
Australia  1971   10886   0.028  
Australia  1976   11742   0.039  
Australia  1981   12689   0.050  
Australia  1986   13608   0.080  
Australia  1992   14458   0.058  
New Zealand  1945   6400   0.073  
New Zealand  1951   6263   0.090  
New Zealand  1956   6772   0.076  
New Zealand  1961   8066   0.049  
New Zealand  1966   9121   0.039  
New Zealand  1971   9726   0.024  
New Zealand  1976   10631   0.034  
New Zealand  1981   10815   0.035  
New Zealand  1986   11704   0.080  
New Zealand  1992   11363   0.100  






   
Figure 1: Distribution of entrepreneurial ability in the model economy 
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Figure 3: Entrepreneurs and own account workers as share of manufacturing workforce: time series data for rich 
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Figure 4: Entrepreneurs and own account workers as share of manufacturing workforce: time series data for poor 
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Figure 5: Entrepreneurs and own account workers as share of total workforce: 
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Figure 6: Entrepreneurs and own account workers as share of total workforce: panel data and model economy, 
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Actual economies Model economy
Source: Data on employee compensation shares in actual economies are taken from United Nations, National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed 
Tables, 1992, Parts I and II (New York: United Nations Publishing Division, 1994).  Data on real per capita GDP are from Penn World Tables v. 5.6 for 1990 or 






   
Figure 8: Operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises for actual economies compared with mixed income of 
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Actual economies Model economy
Source: Data on operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises are taken from United Nations, National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed 
Tables, 1990, Parts I and II (New York: United Nations Publishing Division, 1992).  Data on model economy are taken from model output.  Mixed income of the self-
employed includes labor income, capital income, and entrepreneurial rents accruing to the self-employed.  Data on real GDP per capita are from Penn World Tables, v. 
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Figure 15: Effects of changes in the tax rate charged to large firms -- from 0.0 to 0.35 -- on the fraction of entrepreneurs in the workforce, for 
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